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13 December 1962



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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### DAILY BRIEF

\*Cuba: Recent photography of the four Soviet armored encampments in Cuba reveals continuing activity and no signs of withdrawal.

Photography [ ] of the encampment near Artemisa in eastern Pinar del Rio Province shows that construction has been completed on 10 probable barracks buildings and that work is proceeding on 19 more similar buildings. This is six more buildings, completed or under construction, than were observed [ ] at this camp.

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The [ ] Artemisa photography also showed the continued presence of considerable equipment, including five probable FROG rocket transporters and a large number of tanks and trucks. On the same day, at least 155 vehicles, including 39 tanks, were observed at the Soviet encampment near Remedios in Las Villas Province. Photography of [ ] covering the other two armored group encampments--in Havana and Oriente provinces--showed continuing activity. [ ]

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\*USSR: Khrushchev's lengthy and wide-ranging speech to the Supreme Soviet yesterday was intended as the definitive apologia for his conduct in the Cuban crisis.

The address provided further evidence that the Soviet leaders are going through a period of consolidation and reappraisal of their foreign policy, complicated by the need to deal simultaneously with serious intra-bloc problems aggravated by Peiping's charges of Soviet appeasement on Cuba.

The speech contained no sense of urgency regarding a new round of negotiations on Berlin. Khrushchev implied that domestic problems will be given priority over foreign policy in the period immediately ahead. "All our thoughts," he said, "are turned to creative construction, to the building of Communism."

Khrushchev's concern, however, to discourage the West from adopting a more demanding posture in dealing with Moscow was evident in his warning that Western advocates of a "tough" policy should not assume the USSR will retreat or make concessions on other issues. He reiterated the claim that Soviet strategic weapons "are the best in the world."

Khrushchev's long account of the Cuban crisis was aimed primarily at establishing the point that the USSR had "confirmed its agreement" to withdraw offensive weapons only after a public statement by President Kennedy that--in Khrushchev's words--the "US would not attack Cuba and would restrain its allies from such an action."

The Soviet leader repeated the line that his actions had prevented a US invasion of Cuba, thwarted the desires of "rabid imperialists" to launch a nuclear war,

and proved that the USSR and its allies "are in a position to impose peace on the protagonists of war." He acknowledged, however, that "leading circles in the US" had displayed a "sober approach" and that both sides had made concessions.

The Soviet premier tried to put the best face possible on the USSR's strained relations with Cuba. He hailed Cuba's "glorious leaders headed by our great friend, Fidel Castro," and pledged that the Soviet Union will continue to help the Cubans and never leave them defenseless. He said he would "firmly adhere" to his agreement with President Kennedy as long as the US carries out its pledges, but the USSR would "take such actions as would be required in the circumstances" if the US does not respect its commitments.

Khrushchev went over to the offensive in countering Chinese attacks on his handling of the Cuban crisis. He denounced "irresponsible charges" by people who "call themselves Marxist-Leninists." He defended the correctness of his actions in light of the "time, place, and circumstances" of the Cuban crisis.

For the first time in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Khrushchev confronted the Chinese with their failure to expel the "colonialists" from Hong Kong and Macao. He underscored the parallel with his behavior on Cuba by saying "it would be wrong to push China into some action which it regards as untimely."

Although Khrushchev continued to avoid a direct attack on the Chinese, he made it clear that they were the real target by referring to "those who are pushing" the Albanians into denouncing Soviet actions in Cuba. His personal intervention with such a thinly veiled attack will undoubtedly produce a vigorous Chinese response; this will increase the momentum of the dispute and make it more difficult to avoid a formal break in party relations.

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USSR: The USSR may be preparing to resume nuclear testing in the Arctic.

On 11 December, the Ministry of Defense announced the closure from 15 to 25 December of approximately the same area surrounding Novaya Zemlya

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Premier Khrushchev mentioned that Soviet experts had insisted on testing a new scientific method.

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Sino-Indian Border: The situation along the border remains quiet. The Chinese have announced their withdrawal from Bomdila, in the Northeast Frontier Agency.

The Colombo conference of nonaligned nations adjourned on 12 December after three days of deliberations. The conferees appear to have agreed only that India and China should negotiate rather than fight. Prime Minister Bandaranaike, the conference hostess, will travel to Peiping and New Delhi to present the recommendations of the conferees.

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Brunei: The "North Borneo National Army" revolt appears to have collapsed.

British forces have regained control of all towns and police stations. All hostages held by the rebels have been released. There is still some danger that the rebels may conduct guerrilla warfare from the jungle.

Rebel leader Azahari, still in Manila, has been unable to rally to his cause opponents of the projected Federation of Malaysia. In addition, his plans to make a protest at the UN against the proposed Federation have fizzled. The British Government has canceled Azahari's passport, and he will be unable to travel to New York unless specifically invited by the UN. Delegations from North Borneo and Sarawak which were to have joined him there have backed out.

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NOTES

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[ ]

Syria-Israel: (Tension may ease somewhat between Syria and Israel. The Syrian chief of staff has assured the UN Truce Supervision Organization that Syrian troops will not interfere when Israeli settlers resume farming of the specific piece of land in the demilitarized zone where the shooting incident of 4 December occurred. However, Syria remains determined to resist any "further encroachments" by the Israelis, and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion has emphasized that a new Syrian attack would compel the Israeli Army to retaliate.)

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[ ]

Portugal: (Lisbon has agreed to extend the Azores base agreement, which expires on 31 December, until negotiations over eventual renewal are completed. Portugal had declined to commit itself to extension until warned that the US would have to inform the North Atlantic Council of the status of the US-Portuguese talks.)

[ ]

[ ]

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